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Legal Fact Sheet: CTSG-17-02 
Takings and Coastal Management 
 
 
The “takings” clauses of the federal1 and state2 constitutions provide an independent basis for 
municipal liability in Connecticut. These clauses require compensation to property owners 
when governmental actions result in a “taking” of property either through physical occupation 
of property (e.g., through the exercise of eminent domain powers) or as a result of regulations 
that unconstitutionally limit the use of property. As takings claims arise from the constitution, 
governments are not protected from takings liability by sovereign or statutory immunity.3  
 
This fact sheet reviews the standards under which courts will decide regulatory takings 
cases under both the federal and Connecticut constitutions, as well as whether 
governments can be held liable for inaction as well as action.  
 
Regulatory Takings 
Federal, state, and local governments create regulations to promote the public health, safety, 
and welfare. When these regulations place sufficient limits on land use to rise to the level of a 
“regulatory taking,”4 property owners may file “inverse condemnation” claims against the 
government to recover compensation for their losses.5 Regulatory takings may result from 
actions creating a per se, or total, taking of property value or from a lesser diminution in the 
value or use of property.  
 
Takings cases are fact-specific and may require courts to consider precedents from both federal 
and state law. While takings cases based on the federal constitution must be consistent with 
decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, state courts alone determine the meaning of state 
constitutions. “Historically, Connecticut courts have been more protective of private property 
rights [than federal courts]; however, these old state law cases pre-­‐date and may be superseded 
by more recent U.S. Supreme Court cases that have clarified federal takings analysis.”6 
Therefore, until Connecticut courts clarifies state law by issuing additional decisions, 
distinctions between federal and Connecticut takings law will be necessarily uncertain in some 
respects. 
 
Under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, any regulation that deprives a property owner 
of complete beneficial or economic use of her property is a per se taking under the federal 
constitution.7 Prior to Lucas, Connecticut courts adopted a similar “practical confiscation” test 
that “sits at the intersection of . . . land use regulation and constitutional takings 
jurisprudence.”8 Under this test, a regulation may constitute a taking if it deprives a property 
owner of a complete loss9 of any “economically viable use of his land other than exploiting its 
natural state”10 that is not remedied by the grant of a variance. The courts have determined that 
a practical confiscation has occurred when a regulation removed less than 100% of the value of 
property and has “struck down regulations even where they were designed to prevent 
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2 
significant injuries to the community.”11 However, such cases are the exception and are likely to be 
limited to instances where no permitted use of a property is allowed and no variance or other relief is 
granted.12  
 
Diminution of the value of property that does not rise to a per se taking or practical confiscation may 
also require compensation. Courts determine whether a taking has occurred in such cases under the 
federal constitution by applying a three-factor balancing test laid out in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. City of New York.13 Connecticut courts apply an analogous three-factor balancing test under the state 
constitution to determine whether an action has created a “significant restriction” on land use that must 
be compensated. The three factors considered to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred in 
Connecticut are: (1) the degree of diminution of the value of the land; (2) the nature and degree of public 
harm to be prevented; and (3) the alternatives available to the property owner.14  
 
Recent federal takings decisions have shed new light on takings related to flood control infrastructure. In 
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. U.S., the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers could be held liable under takings for harm to state forest areas caused by deviations from the 
Corps’ normal water diversion operations spelled out in its Water Control Manual.15 In St. Bernard 
Parish v. U.S.,16 the Court of Federal Claims similarly determined that the Corps could be liable for 
failure to properly maintain the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, resulting in increased storm surge and 
flooding in New Orleans during Hurricanes, including Katrina and Rita. These holdings are relevant to 
creation of shoreline protection infrastructure and suggest that creation and maintenance of such 
infrastructure may both result in takings liability for responsible governments if they enhance coastal 
flooding in other areas or fail due to improper maintenance. 
 
Many cases raise takings claims along with statutory claims challenging the case-by-case 
municipal implementation of land use laws. These cases may be resolved on statutory rather than 
constitutional grounds, such that municipal decisions that could theoretically be takings are 
instead overturned as invalid exercises of municipal authority. While this fact sheet focuses on 
takings law, such statutory issues should also be considered.  
 
Taking Through Inaction 
Regulatory takings generally arise from action by the government, such as a decision to issue or deny a 
permit.17 Two Connecticut courts have considered claims for compensation due to government inaction. 
In Citino v. Redevelopment Agency of the City of Hartford, the city was held liable to a neighboring 
landowner who materially and detrimentally relied on a promised redevelopment project that did not 
occur.18 This holding was subsequently reviewed in Dibble Edge Partners v. Town of Wallingford, 
where the court found that a municipality will be liable for condemnation by inaction where “the 
inaction claimed is based upon a provision that is mandatory and so long as it has been sufficiently relied 
upon by the inversely condemned property owner.”19  
 
The impact of these two cases may be limited in the future, as the Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to 
consider whether and when a municipality may be liable for failure to act. However, these findings are 
consistent with one recent holdings in Maryland, where courts have found takings “where a plaintiff 
alleges a taking caused by a governmental entity’s . . . failure to act, in the face of an affirmative duty to 
act.”20 Other states have adopted different standards, however.21  
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Based on existing law, local governments in Connecticut will not be liable for inaction related to 
shoreline erosion or protection unless they are under an affirmative legal duty to protect the shoreline. 
Conversely, once a municipality builds shoreline protection infrastructure, it may be subject to takings 
liability if the infrastructure is ineffective or is not adequately maintained.22 For example, a town that 
erects a seawall system to protect a neighborhood from flooding and erosion could be liable in the future 
to shoreline property owners if the system is overcome or breached. On the other hand, the town does 
not appear to be liable if it does not erect such a system in the first place, as it is not under any legal 
obligation to do so.  
 
Changing Takings Law 
Takings law cannot be changed through legislation alone because it is grounded in the federal and state 
constitutions.23 As a result, local and state governments must either plan for payment of compensation 
when enacting laws and regulations that will result in takings or tailor their efforts to avoid causing a 
taking. Governments can avoid causing regulatory takings by ensuring that regulations do not rise to the 
level of a per se taking and, secondarily, by considering the factors courts will use to determine if a 
regulation caused a significant restriction on land use. In addition, governments may wish to avoid 
passive takings liability by considering the full life-cycle costs of building or accepting responsibility for 
maintaining coastal infrastructure, such as roads and seawalls. 
 
Questions Answered 
In November 2015, Connecticut Sea Grant and CLEAR held a workshop on the legal aspects of 
climate adaptation. Participants were asked to write down questions or issues they had about the topic. 
Over fifty questions were asked and a complete list can be found on the Adapt CT website at 
http://climate.uconn.edu/caa/. This Fact Sheet answers the following questions from the workshop: 
Government Action (zoning/plans/regulations) 
17. How does local/State government start to enact meaningful statutes and regulations that address 
climate change, knowing that this will affect property rights?  How do we start changing the laws 
involved with “takings”?     
Property Rights/Permitting 
11. Can inaction by a government entity be a taking?  i.e. If continual erosion is known and expected 
and makes private property undevelopable must the government take action (build a F&ECS) to 
mitigate the erosion and keep the property(ies) whole? 
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U.S. Const. Amend. 5 (“No person shall be…deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 2	  Conn.	  Const.	  Art.	  I.,	  Sec.	  11	  (“The	  property	  of	  no	  person	  shall	  be	  taken	  for	  public	  use,	  without	  just	  compensation	  therefor.”).	  3	  Laurel,	  Inc.	  v.	  State	  of	  Conn.,	  362	  A.2d	  1383,	  1387	  (Conn.	  1975).	  4	  See	  Penn.	  Coal	  Co.	  v.	  Mahon,	  260	  US	  393,	  415	  (1922).	  5	  Cumberland	  Farms,	  Inc.	  v.	  Groton,	  808	  A.2d	  1107,	  1125	  (Conn.	  2002),	  quoting	  U.S.	  v.	  Clarke,	  445	  U.S.	  253,	  257	  (1980)	  (“Inverse	  condemnation	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  action	  against	  a	  governmental	  defendant	  to	  recover	  the	  value	  of	  property	  which	  has	  been	  taken	  in	  fact	  by	  the	  governmental	  defendant,	  even	  though	  no	  formal	  exercise	  of	  the	  power	  of	  eminent	  domain	  has	  been	  attempted	  by	  the	  taking	  agency.”);	  Cumberland	  Farms,	  Inc.,	  808	  A.2d	  at	  1126	  n.30	  (reviewing	  evolution	  of	  Connecticut	  regulatory	  takings	  and	  compensation).	  6	  Jessica	  Grannis	  et	  al.,	  Coastal	  Management	  in	  the	  Face	  of	  Rising	  Seas:	  Legal	  Strategies	  for	  Connecticut,	  5	  SEA	  GRANT	  LAW	  &	  POL’Y	  J.	  59,	  70	  (2012).	  7	  Lucas	  v.	  S.C.	  Coastal	  Council,	  505	  U.S.	  1003,	  1024,	  1027	  (1992).	  	  8	  Verrillo	  v.	  Zoning	  Board	  of	  Appeals,	  111	  A.3d	  473,	  503	  (Conn.	  2015).	  9	  Green	  Falls	  Assoc.	  v.	  Zoning	  Bd.	  App.	  of	  Town	  of	  Montville,	  53	  A.3d	  273,	  282	  n.9	  (Conn.	  App.	  2012).	  “Evidence	  that	  a	  property	  is	  not	  ‘practically	  worthless’	  but	  ‘still	  possesses	  value’	  precludes	  a	  finding	  of	  practical	  confiscation.”	  Verrillo	  v.	  Zoning	  Board	  of	  Appeals,	  111	  A.3d	  at	  504.	  10	  Bauer	  v.	  Waste	  Mgmt.	  of	  Conn.,	  Inc.,	  662	  A.2d	  1179,	  1197	  (Conn.	  1995),	  quoting	  Gil	  v.	  Inland	  Wetlands	  &	  Watercourses	  Agency,	  219	  Conn.	  404,	  413	  (Conn	  1991).	  	  11	  Grannis	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  71.	  12	  See	  Caruso	  v.	  Zoning	  Bd.	  App.	  Of	  City	  of	  Meriden,	  130	  A.3d	  241	  (Conn.	  1026)	  (reviewing	  practical	  confiscation	  jurisprudence).	  For	  example,	  the	  Connecticut	  Appellate	  Court	  declined	  to	  find	  a	  taking	  upon	  denial	  of	  a	  variance	  for	  a	  property	  purchased	  for	  $45,000	  when	  the	  property	  was	  assessed	  at	  $6750	  and	  there	  was	  an	  offer	  to	  purchase	  for	  $1500,	  and	  where	  a	  smaller	  house	  could	  be	  constructed	  on	  the	  lot.	  Green	  Falls	  Assoc.	  v.	  Zoning	  Bd.	  App.	  of	  Town	  of	  Montville,	  53	  A.3d	  273	  (Conn.	  App.	  2012).	  13	  438	  U.S.	  104,	  124	  (1978).	  	  14	  Chevron	  Oil	  Co.	  v.	  Zoning	  Bd.	  of	  App.	  of	  Town	  of	  Shelton,	  365	  A.2d	  387,	  390	  (Conn.	  1976).	  	  15	  133	  S.Ct.	  511	  (2012).	  16	  121	  Fed.	  Cl.	  687	  (2015).	  
  
 
5 
                                                                                                                                                                            17	  A	  few	  courts	  and	  commentators	  have	  begun	  to	  consider	  whether	  inaction	  by	  a	  government	  may	  result	  in	  a	  taking	  requiring	  payment	  of	  compensation.	  Such	  “passive	  takings”	  would	  impose	  a	  duty	  on	  the	  government	  to	  intervene	  or	  pay	  compensation	  to	  a	  property	  owner.	  	  Such	  a	  duty	  could	  theoretically	  exist	  where	  “the	  government	  is	  so	  entangled	  in	  the	  substantive	  content	  of	  property	  that	  the	  line	  between	  acts	  and	  omissions	  becomes	  especially	  blurry—for	  example,	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  government	  has	  acted	  to	  disable	  property	  owners'	  self-­‐help.	  For	  more	  on	  passive	  takings,	  please	  refer	  to:	  Christopher	  Serkin,	  Passive	  Takings:	  The	  State’s	  Affirmative	  Duty	  to	  Protect	  Property,	  113	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  345,	  346	  (2014).	  18	  721	  A.2d	  1197	  (Conn.	  App.	  Ct.	  1998),	  overruled	  in	  part	  on	  other	  grounds	  by	  Kaczynski	  v.	  Kaczynski,	  981	  A.2d	  1068	  (Conn.	  2009).	  19	  No.	  CV064006084S,	  46	  Conn.	  L.	  Rptr.	  250,	  2008	  WL	  4038946,	  at	  *16	  (Conn.	  Super.	  Ct.	  Aug.	  6,	  2008).	  20	  Litz	  v.	  Md.	  Dept.	  of	  Env’t,	  131	  A.3d	  923	  (Md.	  2016).	  21	  Id.	  (reviewing	  cases);	  see	  also	  11A	  McQuillin	  The	  Law	  of	  Municipal	  Corps.	  §	  32:158.50	  (3d.	  Ed.	  July	  2016)	  (noting	  a	  variety	  of	  approaches	  adopted	  by	  states,	  including	  liability	  for	  inaction	  generally;	  liability	  for	  inaction	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  affirmative	  duty	  to	  act;	  or	  a	  prohibition	  on	  liability	  for	  inaction).	  22	  Jordan	  v.	  St.	  Johns	  Cy.,	  63	  So.3d	  835	  (Fla.	  Dist.	  Ct.	  App.	  2011)	  (holding	  county	  liable	  in	  takings	  for	  abandoning	  road).	  23	  Boulanger	  v.	  Town	  of	  Old	  Lyme,	  16	  A.3d	  889,	  911	  (Conn.	  Super.	  Ct.	  2010).	  	  	  	  February	  2017	  
